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**MEMORANDUM**

The United States Intelligence Board concluded its estimate on Soviet general purpose forces this morning.

They conclude:

1. The Soviets maintain 110 to 140 line divisions of which 60 to 75 are considered as at combat strength (85% or more), the remainder at reduced strength (60% to 70%), or at cadre strength (25% or less).

3.	Command and support	400,000
	Ground forces	1,600,000 - 1,800,000
	Tactical air	150,000
	Naval	400,000
	Total general purpose including command and support	2,550,000 - 2,750,000
	Strategic defense forces	400,000
	Strategic attack forces	300,000
	Total armed services	3,250,000 - 3,450,000

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3. The satellite ground forces estimated at 62 divisions at various strengths and effectiveness - about 940,000 men.

4. The Soviets could place 50 to 60 divisions (including 5 to 15 satellite divisions) on line against Western Europe within about 30 days after decision. This includes 22 divisions now in East Germany and Poland.

Total combat and support manpower in these forces would be 910,000 to 1,100,000.

5. Ground force divisions are modern and mobile, but deficient both qualitatively and quantitatively in support and other equipment. They are backed by large mobilization potential.

6. Divisions equipped with tactical missiles, nuclear and toxic bombs and warheads.

7. Soviets have a deficiency of tactical air, an offensive naval capability, air lift and sea lift.

8. Soviet basic military doctrine anticipates nuclear war from the start or shortly thereafter. Forces are not equipped for warfare in remote areas.

9. We know there are sharp differences among military planners and hence the evolution of Soviet forces seems to be based on compromise.

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